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1. Introduction. Having been long overshadowed by other notions of underdetermination, the question of the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data has lately attracted increasing attention. Kyle Stanford’s recent book [Stanford 2006] makes the point that it is this form of underdetermination, referred to under the name ‘transient underdetermination’, that offers the strongest argument against scientific realism. In a more specific scientific context, [Dawid 2006] argues that indications for strong limitations to the same kind of underdetermination – called scientific underdetermination in the article – are responsible for the trust string physicists have in their theory despite the theory’s lack of empirical confirmation. 
The present paper will emphasise the importance of scientific underdetermination in a context that has mostly been discussed in quite different terms so far. It shall be argued that limitations to scientific underdetermination can provide a viable explanation of the predictive success of science and may be abductively inferred on that ground. The structure of the argument resembles the classical no miracles argument (NMA) [Putnam 1975], which abductively infers scientific realism from the predictive success of science and is often considered the best available argument in favour of scientific realism. It shall be demonstrated in the following that the posit of limitations to scientific underdetermination provides a substantially more satisfactory framework for explaining the predictive success of science than full fledged scientific realism. The notion of limitations to underdetermination will have to adopt some elements of scientific realism, though, to fulfil its task. In analogy to the case of classical NMA, inference to the best explanation can then lead from the predictive success of science to the actual posit of the explanatory successful limitations to scientific underdetermination. 
After a short analysis of some reasons for the failure of classical NMA in Section 2, Sections 3 and 4 discuss the significance of the question of scientific underdetermination in the given context. Section 5 presents the general layout of an argument that works analogously to NMA but is based on underdetermination. The argument relies on the concepts of scientific preconception and limitations to scientific underdetermination which are analysed in detail in Sections 6 and 7. The final section compares the posit of limitations to underdetermination with traditional scientific realism.


2. Why classical NMA is bound to fail. NMA is a three step argument. First it is asserted that the frequent predictive success of science looks like a miracle as long as one does not assume scientific realism. Then it is argued that scientific realism, i.e. the position that the statements of well-established scientific theories are largely approximately true in a literal sense, can in fact provide a satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. Finally, inference to the best explanation leads to the conclusion that scientific realism is probably true. Some philosophers (see e.g. [Musgrave 1985]) have specified step one by emphasising that only successful predictions of genuinely novel phenomena require a realist explanation, while the frequent occurrence of correct scientific predictions which constitute mere extrapolations of a pattern of observations are explicable based on the validity of the principle of induction without any further assumptions. This more specific understanding of NMA shall be adopted in the following.
While the viability of NMA has been questioned in a number of ways, at this point we want to focus on one fundamental problem that may be phrased in terms of a dilemma with respect to the specific interpretation of the notion of “predictive success of science”. The latter notion can be understood in two distinct ways. One interpretation takes predictive success of science as referring to the success of individual scientific theories: the philosopher asks why specific scientific theories make successful predictions. Understood in this sense, the notion of scientific success is placed at the level of theory analysis and shall thus be called the analytic notion. The version of NMA based on it shall be called analytic NMA. The alternative is to understand predictive success of science as referring to the scientific process. In this understanding, the phenomenon to be explained by NMA is not the predictive success of individual theories but rather the fact that the scientific process frequently leads to the emergence of theories which make successful predictions. The core of the question is thus shifted to an epistemic level: why are scientists capable of finding predictively successful theories so often? This second notion of predictive success shall be called the epistemic notion. The version of NMA based on it shall be called epistemic NMA. Both the analytic and the epistemic understanding of NMA can be found in the literature​[1]​ and quite frequently the distinction is not clearly spelled out. Once the distinction between the two understandings of scientific success has been acknowledged, however, it is quite straightforward to show that neither can fully support NMA: while the analytic notion fails to establish step one of the argument laid out in the first paragraph of this section, the epistemic notion does not support step two.
Looking at the analytic notion of scientific success, one first notes that the specification “predictive” with regard to scientific success adds nothing of significance. The plain analysis of a scientific theory is insensitive to the distinction between empirical data that influenced the theory’s creation and the empirical data the theory predicts. Scientific success at this level of discussion is reduced to the fact that the theory saves the phenomena. On that basis, however, the explanation of predictive success turns into a fairly unspectacular enterprise. A theory’s success can be understood to be the immediate consequence of two primitive facts: the theory’s mathematical structure (plus its physical interpretation) on the one hand and the empirical data on the other. A theory’s predictive success then is sufficiently explained by pointing out that, qua its mathematical structure and the way it is fit to the data already available, the theory is empirically adequate with respect to some data set collected after its creation. Following the scientist’s intuitive notion of explanation, one may even add another explanatory level and explain a theory’s success based on its capability to serve as an effective description of some other, more advanced and even more successful theory. In conjunction, the two given explanations provide a fairly complete understanding of the reasons for scientific success at an analytic level. The scientific realist seems to be at loss to offer a plausible reason why any other, more ‘metaphysical’ explanation of scientific success in the analytic sense should be required. Resorting to scientific realism just looks superfluous. (This grosso modo corresponds to one of the arguments put forward by van Fraassen in [van Fraassen 1980], who apparently reads NMA in terms of the analytic notion of predictive scientific success.) 
The realist might try to sidestep the above criticism by adopting an explanandum other than predictive success at step one of NMA, thereby leaving the terrain of genuine NMA staked out in the first paragraph of this section. In this vein, the so called cosmic coincidence argument [Smart 1963] asserts that the phenomenon to be explained is not so much predictive success, but rather the fact that one theory is capable of reproducing empirical data collected in a number of different and seemingly independent empirical and technical contexts. On that basis, the cosmic coincidence argument then proceeds exactly like NMA by making the claim that only scientific realism can provide the required explanation. Just like analytic NMA, however, cosmic coincidence faces a serious problem already at step one of the argument: while it seems correct that an individual theory is unlikely to describe many independent phenomena accurately, this statement on its own does not determine the probability for the existence of theories that provide such a unified description. The additional piece of information required for stating that probability would be the number of possible scientific theories. The situation may be compared to a lottery where, despite the fact that winning is improbable for each individual player, it may still be likely that someone will do so for the simple reason that many people participate. Analogously, a sufficiently large number of possible theories could explain the existence of one or even many theories which cover several independent phenomena on purely numerical grounds. In this light, as the cosmic coincidence argument does not offer any specification of the number of possible scientific theories, it fails to establish that the existence of theories that describe many independent phenomena is implausible without realism. Like in the case of analytic NMA, the deployment of scientific realism seems superfluous. 
Though the cosmic coincidence argument is of an analytic nature (i.e. does not require any epistemic element), the stated argument against it can also be phrased in epistemic terms, which turns it into the Darwinian argument given by [van Fraassen 1980]. The fact that we have theories which reproduce several phenomena correctly may be explained by pointing out that scientists spend a lot of time and diligence looking for those theories that satisfy that condition and discard all others. If one assumes sufficiently extensive theoretical resources, a theory’s seemingly unlikely capability of interconnecting different phenomena therefore can become plausible as the result of a complex and directed evolutionary process without any reference to realism.
So far, we have not even succeeded in establishing the first of the three steps required for a successful abductive inference from scientific success to scientific realism: we have not even found a problem scientific realism could try to solve. The epistemic notion of predictive scientific success does master this first step. Both antirealist arguments introduced above fail against epistemic NMA. The phenomenon of the frequent occurrence of successful predictions of new phenomena in science can not be explained away by simple reference to the individual theories’ properties. Alluding to empirical adequacy would merely amount to restating the problem rather than to solving it. Nor does it help to refer to Darwinian reasoning. Since the problem now has become to explain why scientists choose the ‘right’ theories with respect to empirical data that has not influenced the process of theory selection, pointing at the process of theory selection just begs the question. The antirealist can still retort by denying any significant tendency towards successful predictions of novel phenomena in natural science (see e.g. [Fine 1986]). This claim looks fairly unconvincing, however. Even though it seems difficult to come up with any kind of theory counting algorithm that would allow for a quantitative assessment of the ratio of those scientific theories in a field that give successful predictions, it is obvious that the exact sciences have a dramatically higher rate of novel predictive success than other kinds of scientific analysis (like humanities) or other kinds of intellectual activity (like science fiction). This difference does seem to deserve some kind of explanation. While such an explanation may not necessarily start with allusions to realism but could emphasise a number of structural differences between exact sciences and other fields of intellectual activity, the question why those differences amount to better perspectives for the prediction of new phenomena leads up to the very problem NMA addresses.
Epistemic NMA therefore is far more successful than its analytic cousin in establishing that it addresses a serious problem that afflicts the understanding of science. It achieves this success by increasing the explanatory task for scientific realism. Unfortunately, it thereby seems to raise the bar to a height scientific realism is utterly incapable of jumping. As pointed out e. g. by Arthur Fine [Fine 1986], even if the realist were right in asserting that a theory’s approximate truth can be inferred from its past predictive success (which would imply that scientific realism could be successfully deployed in analytic NMA), the available empirical evidence would offer no reason for assuming that the theory’s approximate truth extends to those theoretical aspects which are responsible for the prediction of novel, so far untested phenomena. As long as scientists do not own a metaphysical ‘truth-detector’ but rather look for new theories by trying to fit theoretical structures to the available empirical data, a theory’s truth does not help them select that theory from a number of currently empirically viable alternatives. Therefore, the scientific realist is in no better position than the antirealist to explain the scientist’s capability of generating successful scientific predictions of novel phenomena. Scientific realism seems incapable of explaining why scientists generate predictive success. 

3. The Case for Scientific Underdetermination. NMA fails because it cannot escape a lethal dilemma: if it merely addresses the predictive success of individual scientific theories, there is nothing “miraculous” to be explained; if it addresses the predictive success of the scientific process, an interesting problem does arise, but scientific realism is incapable of offering a solution. The present paper aims at providing an alternative to scientific realism that is capable of addressing the second, epistemic problem in a satisfactory way.
In the context of the cosmic coincidence argument, we have already encountered the question that shall be crucial for achieving the envisioned goal. The reason why the cosmic coincidence argument does not get off the ground lies in its silence regarding the question of how many possible scientific theories could fit the available empirical data. It shall be argued in the following that this question, the question of the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data (henceforth to be called scientific underdetermination) plays an even more interesting role in classical NMA. It will be demonstrated that the implicit assumption of limitations to scientific underdetermination is crucial for the intuitive appeal of NMA as well as for advanced attempts to rescue NMA from the arguments presented in the previous section. Eventually it will turn out that the posit of limitations to scientific underdetermination can provide an explanation of the predictive success of the scientific process independently from the posit of scientific realism.  
Before entering this analysis, however, it is important to give a more precise characterisation of the concept of scientific underdetermination. The notion of underdetermination is used in a variety of different ways in philosophy of science. Philosophers of science either speak about (1) underdetermination considering all logical possibilities or about (2) underdetermination under some general assumptions which constitute the foundation of scientific research.​[2]​ Orthogonal to this distinction, it is important to differentiate between (a) underdetermination by all possible empirical data and (b) underdetermination by the currently available data. Humean underdetermination is the classic example of (1b) while [Quine 1970] exemplifies (2a). Version (2b), the underdetermination by the currently available data under some general pre-assumptions, has been discussed e.g. by [Sklar 1975], [Stanford 2001 & 2006] and [Dawid 2006 & 2007] but has not yet acquired a level of general recognition comparable to that of its abovementioned cousins. Still, it is underdetermination of type (2b) that is most relevant to the scientist who searches for new theories. Obviously, the scientific search for new theories must be based on the empirical evidence currently available. In order to be able to develop theoretical schemes on that basis, the scientist must take for granted the validity of a basic principle of induction, the existence of a coherent theoretical scheme capable of describing the phenomena in question and some vague assumptions about the universality, predictive power and lack of ad-hoc-ness of that scientific scheme. 
Since we will focus on the spectrum of different possible scientific predictions compatible with the presently available data, we will treat all empirically equivalent theories as one theory and ignore their number in our underdetermination analysis.​[3]​ Type (2b) underdetermination in disregard of empirically equivalent theories shall be called ‘scientific underdetermination’, following [Dawid 2006], and will provide the basis for the upcoming discussion.​[4]​ 

4. Intuition-Based Scientific Realism and its Successors. We start the analysis by raising a question that seems to have no immediate connection to scientific underdetermination: how can NMA be defended against Fine’s argument in Section 2? Fine’s argument rests on two pillars: (i) scientific realism is treated as being sufficiently characterized by the claim that well-tested scientific statements are largely approximately true; and (ii) the classical understanding is adopted that only empirical confirmation can serve as an indication of a theory’s viability and, consequently – from the realist’s perspective –, of its approximate truth. The realist can try to save NMA against Fine’s argument by questioning one of these two assumptions. Most straightforwardly, she can claim that there are arguments other than simple empirical confirmation which may suggest the preference of one theory over another. (Deploying arguments of this kind is called ampliative reasoning by [Laudan 1996].) This claim, however, immediately raises the question why ampliative arguments can enhance the chances of predictive success. The most natural realist answer consists in modifying Fine’s first assumption as well by emphasising elements of a realist stance which go beyond an abstract truth-based definition and offer reasons for endorsing ampliative arguments. Ampliative reasoning can then be taken to be predictively successful due to its conformity with reality. It turns out that the undeniable intuitive plausibility of NMA is based on precisely this kind of argument.

Let us imagine, for the moment, a simpler world than the one we live in, where all physical phenomena can be described by applying to unobservable objects the classical physical laws which guide observable processes. A scientific realist in this ‘classical-world’ may endorse the rigid ‘classicality’-condition that all real objects must behave like observable objects. Scientific realism based on the classicality-condition implies severe limitations to scientific theory building by excluding all theoretical schemes which fit the available empirical data but do not have a classical interpretation. Even without knowing anything about the class Dt+1(t) of all possible theories that are compatible with experiments at time t and can be experimentally distinguished at time t+1, it thus may be plausible to assume that the subclass D(cl)t+1(t) of ‘allowed’ classical scenarios​[5]​ contains just a small number of theories. If the latter is the case, the scientist who is committed to classical theories has reasonable chances of picking a theory that makes correct predictions of novel phenomena at the next stage of experimental testing.​[6]​ The scientific realist can explain predictive success in the given scenario by asserting that the scientists’ pre-assumption of classicality is natural as well as true and the ‘classical’ scientific objects conjectured by the scientists on its basis really exist. NMA works in this scenario because the chosen extended notion of scientific realism enforces strong limitations to the underdetermination of theory building by the available data.
For a long time, scientific theory building aimed at defending a watered down version of classical-world, retaining characteristics of observable objects in the conceptions of unobservable objects whenever possible.​[7]​ Successes which were achieved along these lines​[8]​ could then be realistically explained – more or less convincingly - by following the strategy laid out in the classical-world example. Twentieth century physics, however, made life considerably more difficult for the scientific realist. Modern physical theories like special and general relativity, quantum mechanics or gauge field theory jettison so many elements of the intuitive human notions of physical objects, space and time that those elements which have survived so far may be expected to be sacrificed to some future theoretical change. Classical intuitions about the behaviour of physical objects thus don’t play a significant role for the construction and interpretation of today’s fundamental physical theories. As a consequence, scientific realism has left behind its intuitive roots as well. Modern NMA is formulated without any direct reference to intuitive notions of physical objects​[9]​ and focuses on the abstract concept of the relation between a statement’s empirical success and its truth. The negative implications of this step, however, have already been pointed out: if fully retreating to the described core definition, scientific realism forsakes its normative authority in scientific theory building and thus loses its ability to enforce restrictions to the underdetermination of scientific theory building. Lacking this instrument for providing an epistemological explanation of successful theory choice, it finds itself in the unfortunate situation sketched in section 2. 
In order to save NMA, the realist therefore must look for concepts other than ontological naivety which can work as guidelines towards true theories by enforcing limitations to scientific underdetermination. The most popular candidates for this role (see e.g. [Boyd 1984]) are criteria like simplicity, lack of ad-hoc-ness, universality or predictive power​[10]​, which seem to play a significant role in the construction and selection of scientific theories.​[11]​ They may be deployed by the realist in the following way: one finds (i) that successful scientific theories tend to fulfil the abovementioned criteria and (ii) that theories built in accordance with these criteria tend to be successful. Both observations can best be explained by assuming that the true description of reality fulfils the stated criteria or criteria closely related to them. Searching for theories which fulfil the stated criteria then enhances the chances of finding theories which are close to truth. 
A careful look at the structure of the above argument reveals, however, that its success does not depend on the core posit of scientific realism. Scientific predictiveness is explained by introducing general scientific criteria like universality which guide the scientific process and thereby enforce limitations to the underdetermination of theory building. The argument relies solely on the assumption that our present theories in some way reflect the universality or similar properties of the true theory. It remains valid whether or not the substantial claims of current scientific theories are approximately true. 
In addition, the assumption that the application of criteria like universality suffices for guiding the scientist towards predictively successful theories is by no means self-evident. Its validity, in analogy to the case of naïve ‘classical’ realism, is closely bound to the viability of assumptions about sufficient limitations to the underdetermination of theory building which are enforced by the available data under a given set of preconditions. These assumptions constitute the actual core posits of any attempt to explain scientific success based on the scientists’ adoption of some set of preconceptions which guide theory selection. The scientific realist’s reference to additional criteria for theory selection thus is based on a misjudgement with respect to the focus of the applied argument. The explanatory power provided by those criteria does not depend on the approximate truth of the scientific theories actually selected. Rather, it is based entirely on the posit of significant limitations to the underdetermination of theory building that is carried out in accordance with the given criteria of theory selection. 

5. A Different Way of Explaining Scientific Success. A picture emerges that suggests an altered perspective on the question of predictive success in science. While the explanatory power of scientific realism dwindles in more abstract, unintuitive scientific contexts, the question of scientific underdetermination retains its crucial position for an understanding of scientific success. The search for an explanation of scientific success therefore might better focus on an analysis of the limitations to scientific underdetermination without insisting on the posit of full-fledged scientific realism. The classic form of NMA then could be replaced accordingly by an abductive argument that involves scientific underdetermination rather than scientific realism.
We suggest the following approach. The naturalness of scientific success shall be taken to be expressible in terms of the scientist’s options for developing scientific theories based on (i) the available empirical data and (ii) some reasonable general preconceptions about the characteristics of scientific theories. In cases where scientific theory building is vastly underdetermined on that basis, an endorsed scientific theory’s chances of predicting novel phenomena successfully are minimal. The more limited the scientist’s options are, i.e. the stronger limitations to scientific underdetermination arise, the better are the endorsed theory’s chances of novel predictive success. 
Scientific success in this picture is explained based on the two crucial assumptions of the validity of some general scientific preconceptions and the occurrence of limitations to scientific underdetermination on the basis of these preconceptions. Let us develop these assumptions a little more carefully. The posit of limitations to scientific underdetermination puts restrictions on the set of all scientific theories which are compatible with the available data. This posit can only be meaningful if it is based on some specific framework that defines which set of theories we are talking about. Such a framework may naturally be provided by scientific preconceptions which guide scientific theory construction. While the specific character of the required scientific preconceptions shall be discussed in the next section, at this point we want to define their general philosophical status. Since the posit of limitations to underdetermination is supposed to explain scientific success, it must rest on solid objective grounds. The scientific preconceptions that provide its framework therefore cannot be understood merely in terms of a working prescription chosen by scientists for pragmatic reasons. Rather, they must be related to the world in a way that allows us to trace the fact of predictive success back to some characteristics of the world itself. It shall thus be assumed that there exists a true theory, or, to be more careful, an empirically adequate theory, that satisfies conditions which represent a stable core of the scientific preconceptions endorsed today. In this sense, today’s scientific preconceptions are taken to be partly empirically adequate, which represents a last vestige of the scientific realist claim that our present theories tell us something true about the world. The message we receive is rather weak, however: it amounts to the modest claim that the world can be fully described by a theory that fulfils a stable core of those scientific preconceptions which are adopted by scientists today. 
Now the claim of limitations to scientific underdetermination can be formulated. It is asserted that, within the framework defined by the posited set of empirically adequate scientific preconceptions, the underdetermination of theory building tends to be significantly limited in exact natural sciences. This assertion shifts the discussion to an entirely different level and constitutes the crucial conceptual novelty of the suggested approach: the reasons for scientific success are not searched for in the real world and its similarity to our present theories but rather in the wider realm of potentiality. Information is sought about the totality of all scientific schemes compatible with the presently available empirical data rather than just about the one true theory. 
The above analysis faces the obvious problem that we do not know the realm of possible theories. Any knowledge about that realm must be rooted in the claim that limitations to the realm of possible theories are necessary for explaining novel predictive success in science. An argument along these lines constitutes abductive inference of the very same kind the scientific realist resorts to in classical NMA: given that the assumption of limitations to scientific underdetermination offers the most straightforward explanation of the predictive success of science and given that no other approach seems to work in a satisfactory way, it is abductively inferred that the core statements which define the approach of limitations to underdetermination are indeed true. Note that the abductive inference involved consists of two separate parts, which only in conjunction provide an explanation of scientific success: the inference to the empirical adequacy of a core of present day’s scientific preconceptions is followed up by the inference to significant limitations to scientific underdetermination based on these scientific preconceptions.

6. Scientific Preconceptions. So far, the two core concepts of the suggested scheme, the scientific preconceptions and the limitations to scientific underdetermination, have not been specified in any detail. The following two sections will aim at sharpening these concepts.
 The suggested explanation of predictive success in science depends on the nature of the scientific preconceptions within which the limitations to scientific underdetermination are asserted. As it was pointed out in the previous section, in order to fulfil their task these preconceptions must be understood as being true of the world rather than just pragmatic or useful. A first attempt at identifying such preconceptions may consist in positing the truth-relevance of the practical limits of scientific theory building encountered by the scientists. Obviously, the conceptual framework of today’s scientific theories strongly determines the search for solutions to new scientific problems. Scientists usually find those scientific solutions which are conceptually similar to the theories they are familiar with. Thus, even if many alternative conceptual schemes existed in principle, most of them would be barely accessible based on the conceptual status quo. At first sight, the conceptual predispositions which de facto guide scientific theory building at each stage might appear like natural candidates for the sought after scientific preconceptions. 
A closer look reveals, however, that this approach is inadequate. To base the explanation of predictive success on the conceptual predispositions behind a given scientific status quo would require positing the predispositions’ validity without offering an explanation why scientists have come to endorse them as opposed to others which would have been compatible with the currently available data as well but would have given rise to theories which offer different predictions. Since conceptual predispositions in a complex scientific framework are highly technical and specific and have been developed based on the contingencies of the historic scientific evolution, their choice is by no means univocal or self-evident. An explanation along the lines characterised above would therefore merely shift the problem of scientific success from the realm of actual theory building to a newly created realm of ‘preconception-building’ without at any rate solving it.  
Just like in the case of scientific theories, there is no reason either for assuming that the present conceptual predispositions will remain viable forever. Currently inaccessible theoretical schemes may well become realistic scientific options in the future if scientific progress changes the general conceptual framework accordingly. Therefore, we have no basis for announcing the approximate truth of those conceptual predispositions which happen to underlie current scientific theories. In consequence, there is no justification for expecting that those theories which are conceptually similar to the present theories have better chances of reproducing the next generation of empirical data than any other theory that is compatible with the presently available data. If we want to assess the overall chances for the viability of some new theory’s predictions, we rather have to consider the totality of all theoretical schemes which are in agreement with the available data and in coherence with any imaginable set of time- and context-dependent conceptual predispositions. 
In order to find scientific preconceptions which are capable of explaining scientific success, two important modifications to the above approach must be made. First, the set of scientific preconceptions which form the foundation for limitations to underdetermination must be posited to contain a stable core that will not be abandoned in any future scientific development. This requirement can be specified by using the concept of empirically adequate theories​[12]​: only those parts of the current scientific preconceptions which remain valid in an empirically adequate theory can provide the basis for stable limitations to underdetermination.​[13]​ Second, the scientific preconceptions must be sufficiently general and ‘natural’ for making plausible their adoption by the scientific community without reference to the actual path of scientific progress. They should rely on general notions about the observed world and must not address specific scientific conceptual choices. The fact that human observers have endorsed the preconceptions in question and extrapolated them to scientific contexts then can be explained e.g. in Darwinian terms. 
Which specific preconceptions can be capable of fulfilling the above conditions? Some plausible candidates have been mentioned already in section 3. Scientists base their activity on the viability of the principle of induction and on the pre-assumption of the existence of a coherent theoretical scheme that provides a universal description of the investigated class of observed phenomena and does not require ad hoc assumptions for integrating individual events. These preconceptions are obviously vague and may well undergo modifications on the edges.​[14]​ In order to provide a workable foundation for an explication of scientific success, however, they neither have to be entirely precise nor to allow a precise knowledge of their stable core at the present time. They just have to make plausible the existence of some stable core that characterises the empirically adequate theory. Since the general direction of abductive reasoning in the presented argument goes from scientific success to limitations to underdetermination and from there to the scientific preconceptions which provide the framework for these limitations, a certain vagueness in the preconceptions’ definition does not impede the argument’s flow. In fact, it would be a mistake to put too much emphasis on a specification of scientific preconceptions that is not univocally supported by the abductive inference from predictive scientific success. Any such move would disturb the abductive character of the overall argument. 

7. Limitations to Scientific Underdetermination. The specification of limitations to scientific underdetermination is a difficult enterprise.  In the following it shall be analyzed based on a simplified model of the scientific evolution that will allow fairly compact reasoning.
The first simplification concerns the sometimes tedious question of an experiment’s reliability and possible systematic errors. It shall be assumed that one can always clearly determine whether an experimental result is compatible or incompatible with a given theory. Since a stable consensus in this respect usually emerges among scientists in the long run, it seems justified to assume that the stated assumption will not affect the qualitative conclusions to be drawn from the analysis.
It shall further be assumed that the scientist who, based on a set of basic preconceptions, has developed a theory that fits the available data has no reason for attributing better chances of predictive success to that theory than to any other scientific theory that could have been constructed in agreement with the available data and the same preconceptions. A few words seem in order to justify this assumption. The assumption is based on the understanding, discussed in earlier sections, that the scientist’s preference of one empirically viable theory over the other can only be justified to the extent it is based on those general scientific preconceptions which determine the concept of scientific underdetermination itself. This understanding can be entirely accurate only under the condition that scientists are unable to predict future changes of their scientific preconceptions. A fully realistic account of the scientific process would have to acknowledge, however, that preconceptions can provide the basis for ‘presentiments’ of their future evolution. An example in case would be the principle of universality. Conventional theories provide universal descriptions of a limited set of physical phenomena. The scientific preconceptions at each stage of scientific progress prescribe universality roughly to the extent realised by the current theories. The step towards more unified theories can enlarge the set of phenomena described by one theory and thereby can set new standards of universality. If theories which introduce a new level of universality get empirically confirmed, that new level is integrated into the set of preconceptions. It may be plausible to expect that future preconceptions will include even higher degrees of universality. The scientist thus may assume that significant improvements of universality which go beyond the level of universality prescribed by the current preconceptions indicate better chances of success of the corresponding theory.  
Neglecting presentiments of future preconceptions nevertheless seems to be a reasonable approximation for discussing the general character of theory dynamics since all viable information that is neglected at a certain stage is included later when the presentiments in question have been vindicated and turned into preconceptions. Disregard of those presentiments thus should merely create a time-lag between the state of actual theory selection and its state in the simplified model. The latter should suffice, though, for providing the basis for a viable qualitative characterisation of the essential reasons for predictive success.
Finally, we have to determine what does and does not count as separate theories. Changes of continuous parameters are not considered different theories but are understood in terms of one theory’s flexibility to fit empirical data. Different models in the sense the term is used in particle physics, i.e. different specific constructions which are all based on the same basic physical laws but vary in the choice of some discrete parameter values which characterize the structure of the scientific scheme, are taken to constitute different theories. A more precise characterization of limitations to underdetermination would have to distinguish between the level of models and the level of general theories and should deal separately with the two levels. In some contexts scientific underdetermination may be strongly limited at the level of theories even though a large number of ‘models’ is compatible with the available data. Nothing more will be said about this distinction in the ensuing simplified discussion, however.

 Up to this point, limitations to underdetermination have been implicitly understood in terms of limitations to the number of possible theories. Limitations could also be formulated in a different way, however, by positing restrictions to the spectrum of possible sets of empirical data. A short look at this option seems in order. If a specific scientific theory that has been built in accordance with the available data makes certain predictions, this means that only a subclass of the data that might in principle be imagined to be collected in the next generation of experiments is compatible with the considered theory. Based on this understanding, we can define the following correlation between predictive success and limitations to underdetermination: the theory’s predictions may be expected to have reasonable chances of being vindicated by the next generation of experiments if the set of data compatible with that theory is not much smaller than the union of all sets of data compatible with any theory that fits the present data and fulfils the basic preconceptions. 
Three problems arise with respect to this kind of limitation, however. First, it is difficult to define a viable measure that can provide the basis for comparing the sets of data allowed for by different theories. Different theories may involve entirely different regularity patterns and degrees of freedom, which are not easily related to each other. Second, the approach prefers less predictive theories since they allow a larger set of possible data. This, however, is at variance with the observation that high predictive power can be a sign of a theory’s validity. Third, the stated kind of limitation to scientific underdetermination only relates individual instances of scientific success to structural restrictions which apply to theory building in those specific cases. While this can provide a technical reason for the success of individual scientific predictions, no general principle is offered that could explain the fact that scientific success regularly occurs. Instances of limited underdetermination must be taken as they come, which is reminiscent of the anti-realist understanding that the occurrence of scientific success does not have to be explained but merely to be described. Limitations to the spectrum of possible empirical predictions thus do not meet the realist’s standards for an explanation of scientific success.
The alternative kind of limitation to scientific underdetermination, as mentioned, focuses on the numbers of theories rather than on the theories’ spectrum of predictions. We want to discuss this scenario based on a schematised model of scientific progress where data is collected in a series of technically improving experiments (…,E(t-1),E(t),E(t+1),…). The index t shall be called the time parameter. Let N(t) be the set that contains all possible theories which satisfy a given set of preconceptions and are compatible with the empirical data collected up to time t, and let us denote the number of these theories (i.e. the cardinality of the set N(t)) by n(t). Now let us imagine a scientist who shares the given set of preconceptions and develops a theory T at time t. If she makes no mistakes, T must be a member of N(t). Let us further imagine that T makes a set of predictions PT(E(t+1)) with respect to the outcome of the next generation of experimental tests E(t+1). Out of the n(t) theories which are members of N(t), there will be a number n(PT(E(t+1))) of theories which reproduce all predictions of PT(E(t+1))  (Note that some of those theories may well make additional predictions, which are not shared by T). Following the arguments outlined in previous sections, we want to assume that there are no reasons for attributing better chances of predictive success to T than to any other member of N(t). Under this condition, the ratio n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t) gives an estimate of T ’s chances for providing correct predictions of the outcome of experiment E(t+1).  If T eventually is confirmed by E(t+1), this establishes that T is a member of the set N(t+1) of those n(t+1) theories​[15]​ which are compatible with the empirical data available after the experiment E(t+1). If T is incompatible with E(t+1), it is no member of N(t+1) and scientists will try to develop an alternative theory that falls into N(t+1). 
In the given terminology, scientific predictive power naturally occurs in situations where n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t) is rather high (i.e. a significant fraction of 1) even though the corresponding predictions PT(E(t+1)) are fairly specific. In cases where it is possible to define and compare the volumes of the spaces of all sets of possible empirical data compatible with E(t) and with E(t+1), the statement can be made a little more precise: scientific predictive power arises if n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t) is significantly higher than the ratio between the volumes of the spaces of possible empirical data sets compatible with the empirical evidence before and after the experiment E(t+1). 
In the form presented so far, the approach does not yet look satisfactory. First, the criticism raised against the approach that posits restrictions to the spectrum of possible predictions equally applies in the present case: once again, the stated kind of limitation to scientific underdetermination merely explains individual instances of scientific success by structural conditions which apply to theory building in those specific cases. No general principle is offered that explains the fact that instances of scientific success, or the specific structural conditions which induce the former, regularly occur. Once again, the approach does not meet the realist’s standards for an explanation of scientific success.
Without positing conditions on the size or structure of N(t), however, not even a satisfactory explanation of individual instances of predictive success can be offered in the present case. If n(t) were infinite, n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t)  would have to be understood in terms of some algorithm which generates all members of N(t) in a series where the ratio between the number of all members of the series generated up to some point and the number of those members generated up to that same point which reproduce the predictions PT(E(t+1)) converges in some suitable sense to n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t). Even if one were ready to acknowledge the possibility of some exhaustive theory generating algorithm, it would be difficult to imagine on what grounds the series of theories generated in this enormously complex process could show the required convergence properties. An explanation even of individual instances of scientific success under these circumstances rings hollow.
The only discernable way of improving the situation is to posit a finiteness condition on the number of theories compatible with some set of empirical data and a specific set of preconceptions. Such a condition gives an obvious meaning to n(PT(E(t+1)))/n(t) and, as it will turn out, also opens better perspectives for providing a general explanation of scientific success. 
A finiteness condition on the number of possible theories carries significant implications, however. Since each instance of a predictive difference between two theories can be related to an experiment that decides the case within the framework of scientific reasoning, the assumption that the number of possible theories is finite at some stage implies that it is possible to specify the experimental tests which rule out all but one class of empirically equivalent theoretical schemes. In other words, a well defined set of empirical data in conjunction with some set of basic scientific preconceptions uniquely​[16]​ determines a final theory that can never be succeeded by another theory that makes different observable predictions.​[17]​ 
Taking the final theory as a point of departure, one can, step by step, relax precision and range of the empirical data or reduce the spectrum of physical phenomena to be covered by the theoretical scheme (i.e. reduce the requirements with respect to theory’s universality) in order to widen the spectrum of possible theories. Predictive success of science can be expected to occur if, taking a step backwards (that is, e.g., from E(t) to E(t-1)), (i) the spectrum of possible theories widens only gradually and (ii) a significant ratio of the theories compatible with E(t-1) reproduces specific correlations or characteristics of the theories compatible with E(t) which are not directly enforced by E(t-1). A scenario that fulfils (i) and (ii), unlike all attempts considered up to now, allows for the formulation of a simple qualitative statement that makes plausible repeated scientific success: coherent scientific theories are a scarce good. The options for coherent and highly universal scientific descriptions of natural phenomena are limited. Structural devices which allow coherent theory building in advanced and difficult cases (and imply specific empirical predictions) are likely to be deployed in a significant share of the scientific theories possible at that stage simply because not too many coherent alternative solutions are likely to exist. 
Of course, predictive power is by no means all-pervasive. In many scientific contexts a wide range of empirically distinguishable scientific theories are capable of reproducing the available empirical data. Those contexts obviously don’t justify trust in one specific theory and the corresponding empirical predictions. In other cases, however, the scientist sees little or no alternatives to the chosen scientific strategy. These latter cases are the ones where predictive success occurs with some reasonable likelihood. In the light of the previous analysis, that predictive success can be explained based on the assumption that the scientist’s subjective and limited observation of a scarcity of options significantly coincides with a scarcity of possible theories in an absolute sense. Based on an empirically adequate set of scientific preconceptions, there only exists a limited number of ways to construct a theory consistent with the available data. This scarcity of options must be considered a structural characteristic of the world beyond the limited scope of present day theorising. The empirically adequate scientific theory and the currently endorsed theory are related to each other by being both members of the same small set of theories that are allowed by the empirically adequate core of the set of scientific preconceptions applied today.
Of all analysed attempts to establish limitations to scientific underdetermination, only this last one has turned out to provide a promising basis for explaining scientific predictive success. The present short analysis does not justify the claim that no other alternatives could be thought of. Still, if after closer and more far-reaching examination no alternative explanations of the predictive success of non-intuitive theorizing were deemed satisfactory, inference to the best explanation could be sharpened from the broad inference to some kind of limitation to scientific underdetermination argued for in Section 5 to a more specific statement: from the regular predictive success of non-intuitive scientific theories and the lack of alternative explanations for that fact it may be inferred that a scenario with a limited number of scientific theoretical options based on a set of absolutely viable preconceptions is what scientists actually encounter. This would imply that the observation of predictive success in science, in connection with the more concrete theoretical assessment of underdetermination of theory building based on the scientist’s understanding of the scientific overall situation she faces, allows the scientist to look beyond the mere web of relations between actual theory and available data at a genuine structural characteristic of the world: namely, its being a realisation of one of only few scientifically viable possibilities.​[18]​ It may be the one loophole the scientist has for viewing beyond the limits drawn by strict empiricism. 

8. Comparison with Scientific Realism. The presented approach of abductive inference to limitations to scientific underdetermination (henceforth ILU) aimed at suggesting an explanation for predictive success in science that does not rely on scientific realism. It is time to recapitulate to what extent this approach can actually evade the various kinds of criticism raised against classical NMA itself. Two important points have already been made so far. It was pointed out in Section 2 that the antirealist denial of any need for an explanation of scientific success fails regarding the strong interpretation of NMA that represents the basis for ILU. The discussion of Sections 3 and 4 then have demonstrated that limitations to underdetermination, unlike scientific realism, can provide an explanation of the predictive success of unintuitive scientific theories. ILU therefore is not affected by Fine’s argument against NMA.   
It may be added that ILU also appears far less vulnerable than NMA to Larry Laudan’s classical line of antirealist reasoning. According to Laudan, history knows a considerable number of examples where false theories have been predictively successful. Laudan’s attack can work at two different levels. First, a pessimistic meta-induction may lead to the conclusion that our present theories will probably be toppled just like their predecessors, which renders assertions of their approximate truth rather implausible. Second, even if one does not accept the pessimistic meta-induction, examples of successful theories that are not approximately true seriously threaten NMA. Since the corresponding instances of predictive success cannot be explained by the theory’s (approximate) truth, the philosopher who demands an explanation of scientific success must assume that an explanation other than truth exists in those cases. If that is so, however, it seems incoherent to use abductive inference towards the approximate truth of scientific statements in any other case without offering convincing reasons why the explanations viable in the first cases, whatever they might be, cannot apply to the case in question. 
 Since ILU does not rely on the approximate truth of scientific statements, it is neither affected by the pessimistic meta-induction nor by the notion that explanations of predictive success that do not rely on truth should exist in some cases. In fact, ILU offers such an alternative explanation of scientific success itself. A historical argument of the type presented by Laudan could only work against ILU if it would make the point that those general scientific preconceptions like universality or lack of ad-hoc-ness which are taken to have an empirically adequate core by ILU would be frequently ignored in scientifically successful theories. Such claims don’t appear in Laudan’s argument and would seem rather implausible. The scientific preconditions deployed by ILU are no ambitious scientific statements but rather play the role of modest background conditions that must be introduced in order to provide any framework for statements of limitations to underdetermination at all. Due to their low key role, they are quite difficult to topple by historical arguments.
One additional point with respect to Laudan’s line of argument should not go unmentioned. By projecting a long term final theory perspective, ILU actually contradicts the absolute validity of the pessimistic meta-induction without questioning the examples on which it is founded. ILU could therefore, under some circumstances, be deployed for defending scientific realist claims against the pessimistic meta-induction.
We have seen that ILU fares quite well in dealing with three of the classical arguments against NMA. A fourth argument, however, affects ILU in the same way as NMA. Just like NMA, ILU is based on abductive reasoning. It has been argued (see [Laudan 1996]) that the antirealist who rejects the philosophical viability of abductive reasoning must remain unimpressed by an argument that is based on that very principle.​[19]​ The validity of abductive reasoning in a philosophical context remains a question of crucial importance for ILU just as for NMA. 

The concluding part of the paper shall be devoted to the question as to how big the gap really is between ILU and various forms of scientific realism. In one crucial respect ILU differs fundamentally from both ontological and structural scientific realism. Unlike the latter, it neither implies that the objects or structures posited in today’s scientific theories typically refer nor that today’s scientific statements are mostly approximate true.
	In several respects, however, the approach is carried by a somewhat realist spirit. It rests on the conviction, shared by the realist, that the predictive success of science is in need of explanation. In addition, just like scientific realism, it assumes that there exists an objectively viable (though not necessarily ontologically unique) description of the world towards which scientific theories converge. 
Though abstaining from any truth claims with respect to scientific statements, ILU does make two definite claims which reach out beyond the relation between the present theory and the available empirical data. The first statement concerns the relation between the current theory and the empirically adequate theory: it asserts that a stable core of fundamental scientific preconceptions survives all the way to an empirically adequate theory. The second statement, though referring to the realm of potentiality rather than the actual world, still could be called a statement about reality in a wider sense: it is asserted that scientific success tells something objective about the space of scientific possibilities. Both statements may be taken to involve elements of epistemic scientific realism. By establishing claims which reach beyond an appraisal of the current theories’ empirical merits, they clearly distinguish the presented approach from all forms of empiricism. 
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^1	  An example for an epistemic understanding of NMA is [Musgrave 1985], a recent example for an analytic understanding is [Lyons 2003].
^2	  Such general assumptions are called ‘The ampliative rules of scientific method’ in [Laudan 1996].
^3	  I am grateful to M. Baumgartner for insisting on that point.
^4	  The present paper does not adopt Sklar’s notion of ‘transient underdetermination’ because the term ‘transient’ would be seriously misleading in the given context. Sklar’s analysis focuses on ‘local’ situations in theory space where underdetermination is actualized by a specific number of theories known to be compatible with the available data. The term ‘transient’ makes sense there, since underdetermination can be removed by carrying out the experiments necessary for excluding all but one of the given theories. The present work, to the contrary, aims at understanding the global picture by addressing the question how many scientific theories compatible with the available data can be constructed in principle. In that context, the term ‘transient’ would insinuate that the number of possible theories is finite, which, at this stage, would constitute an unwarranted assumption.
^5	   D(t+1) does not count separately theories which are distinguished only by objects of a size too small to be observed by the experiments carried out at time t+1.
^6	  The classical properties of the objects which are conjectured based on the given data will carry hitherto untested observable implications which can be confidently predicted if only few classical reconstructions of the data seem possible. The successful theories can merely be taken to be approximately true because new classes of classical objects which do not have any observable effects at time t+1 may enter the picture at a later stage.
^7	  Early claims of a univocal relation between the visible phenomena and the theory compatible with them like Newton’s ‘deduction from the phenomena’ arguably may be understood to a considerable extent as being based on this approach. Later examples of inferences of a similar kind like the examples from early quantum physics presented in [Norton 1993 &1994] would be better described in more abstract terms as being based on the kind of ‘conceptual predispositions’ discussed in Section 6.
^8	  Prominent examples are the kinetic gas theory or early atomic models.
^9	  Realism at the beginning of the 20th century, to the contrary, was still based on a largely intuitive notion of physical objects. Duhem’s arguments against a realist interpretation of scientific theories [Duhem 1906] were mainly attacking the deployment of classical ideas about physical objects in the microworld.
^10	  Predictive power denotes the extent to which a theory predicts specific future empirical data. This has to be clearly distinguished from predictive success, which denotes the extent to which a theory’s predictions are being empirically confirmed.
^11	  In a slightly different context, [Forster and Sober 1994] have argued for a justification of the preference of simplicity, universality and lack of ad-hoc-ness based on allegedly higher estimated predictive accuracy. The present discussion, being concerned with the question why predictive success with respect to novel phenomena arises at all, will remain independent of these considerations.  A more exhaustive analysis of the role of the cited preconditions, however, might profit from a comparison between the two lines of argument. 
^12	  The notion of empirical adequacy follows [van Fraassen 1980]. The assumption that an empirically adequate scientific theory exists is non-trivial but shall be taken for granted here. The stringent limitations to underdetermination introduced in section 7 will strictly imply the existence of an empirically adequate theory.
^13	  Empirical adequacy has also been used as a basis for an explanation of scientific success by [Lyons 2003]. Lyons’ approach remains closer to the argumentative strategy of classic NMA than the approach discussed in the present paper. While providing a solution to other problems of NMA, it deals with what is called ‘analytic NMA’ in section 2 and does not offer solutions to the epistemological problems faced by the kind of NMA that is based on the success of the scientific process. 
^14	  A prominent example of a modification of a fundamental scientific preconception is the introduction of an irreducible element of statistics in quantum physics. This step implies that there are phenomena – the individual outcomes of quantum processes – whose specific form does not have an exhaustive structural explanation. The scientific scheme retreats towards structuring the statistical distribution of quantum physical events. 
^15	  n(t+1) may be larger or smaller than n(PT(E(t+1)). It may be larger, because N(t+1) may include theories which are less predictive than T. It may be smaller, because N(PT(E(t+1)) may include theories which make the predictions made by T  plus some others which are refuted by experiment E(t+1).
^16	  Modulo possible empirically equivalent theories.
^17	  This final theory may or may not be within reach of experiments realistically conceivable today. 
^18	  This, at the given point, of course only pertains to the question of possible theories while leaving open the questions of possible boundary conditions and possible parameter values allowed by a theory.
^19	  While the problems of NMA addressed so far were located at steps one and two of the reasoning of NMA spelled out at the beginning of Section 2, the present problem addresses step three.
